Abstract-We investigate a jamming attack on the communication network of a multi-agent system in a formation. We propose a communication and motion model for the agents. The communication model provides a relation in the spatial domain for effective jamming by an intruder. We formulate the problem as a zero-sum pursuit-evasion game. In our earlier work we used Isaacs' approach to obtain motion strategies for a network of agents to evade the jamming attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic warfare has proved to be an efficient combat technique in military scenarios. In the past year, there have been reports of predator drones being hacked [12] , [18] resulting in intruders gaining access to classified data being transmitted from an aircraft. Unauthorized intrusion of such kind has started a race between the engineers and the hackers as a result of which smarter systems are emerging everyday in order to secure modern instrumentation and software from unwanted exogenous attacks. This work deals with such a scenario of malicious intrusion and disruption, namely jamming in the communication network of multi-agent systems. Our interest lies in studying the interplay between the communication and the configurational constraints present in mobile multi-agent systems in order to mitigate jamming attacks.
Jamming is a malicious attack whose objective is to disrupt the communication of the victim network intentionally, causing interference or collision at the receiver side. Jamming attack is a well-studied and active area of research in wireless networks. Many defense strategies have been proposed by researchers against jamming in wireless networks. A brief survey of various techniques in jamming relevant to our research is provided in [5] . In the case of a single jammer trying to intrude the communication link between a transmitter and a receiver, the problem can be formulated as multiplayer pursuit-evasion game [14] , [1] . In [5] , we investigated the problem of finding motion strategies for two UAVs to evade All authors are with the Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801; emails: {sbhattac, gupta54, basar1}@illinois.edu.
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jamming in the presence of an aerial intruder. We considered a differential game theoretic approach to compute optimal strategies by a team of UAVs. We formulated the problem as a zero-sum pursuit-evasion game. The cost function was picked as the termination time of the game. We used Isaacs' approach to derive the necessary conditions to arrive at the equations governing the saddle-point strategies of the players. In [7] , we extended the previous analysis to a team of heterogeneous vehicles containing UAVs and autonomous ground vehicles (AGVs).
In the case when we have three or more agents in the network, we can pose the problem of mitigating the adverse effects of jamming as a connectivity maintenance problem in multi-agent systems. Substantial research has been done in the recent past to address the problem of maintaining connectivity in mobile networks in the absence of an adversary [15] , [11] , [20] , [29] , [28] . In our previous work [6] , we had addressed the problem of a team of mobile agents that try to maintain connectivity in the communication network in the presence of a jammer in the vicinity. This analysis was based on the assumption that each agent had a perfect state information about all the other agents. In reality, the presence of a jammer in the vicinity renders the communication network to be a sparsely connected graph. This leads to congestion and eventually an overall delay in exchanging state information among all the agents in the team. Therefore, the solution to the original game under fullstate perfect information pattern is rendered inutile. In the past, derivation of distributed algorithms for the computation of non-cooperative equilibria of certain classes of games has been addressed in [3] , [17] . It has been shown in these papers that when the cost function is convex or if the system is linear with quadratic cost, then the policy iteration algorithm converges to the Nash equilibrium. In the absence of information, decentralized decision making has been proven to be intractable for discrete static team decision problems [23] , [27] , [2] . Some approximation schemes are available for discrete team decision problem under limited information [10] . However, there has been limited work on solving differential game problems under limited information [9] . This work is a step in this direction.
In this work, we analyze a continuous time pursuit-evasion game in which the players have a decentralized information structure. Each player has a knowledge about the solution of the game under the assumption that the information pattern is centralized. Based on this solution, the players device approximation schemes in order to play the game. The rest of the document is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the problem formulation. We explain the jamming model and the dynamical system model. In Section III, we present an approximation scheme and analyze a lower bound on the termination time. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first introduce the communication model between two mobile nodes in the presence of a jammer. Then we present the dynamical equations and the information pattern among the agents.
A. Jammer and Communication Model
Consider a mobile node (receiver) receiving messages from another mobile node (transmitter) at some frequency. Both communicating nodes are assumed to be lying on a plane. Consider a third node that is attempting to jam the communication channel in between the transmitter and the receiver by sending a high power noise at the same frequency. This kind of jamming is referred to as the trivial jamming. A variety of metrics can be used to compare the effectiveness of various jamming attacks. Some of these metrics are energy efficiency, low probability of detection, and strong denial of service [22] [21] . In this paper, we use the ratio of the jamming-power to the signal-power (JSR) as the metric. From [24] , we have the following models for the JSR (ξ) at the receiver's antenna.
1) R n model
where P JT is the power of the jammer transmitting antenna, P T is the power of the transmitter, G T R is the antenna gain from transmitter to receiver, G RT is the antenna gain from receiver to transmitter, G JR is the antenna gain from jammer to receiver, G RJ is the antenna gain from receiver to jammer, h J is the height of the jammer antenna above the ground, h T is the height of the transmitter antenna above the ground, D T R is the Euclidean distance between transmitter and receiver, and D JR is the Euclidean distance between jammer and receiver. All the above models are based on the propagation loss depending on the distance of the jammer and the transmitter from the receiver. In all the above models the jammer to signal ratio is dependent on the ratio
For digital signals, the jammer's goal is to raise the ratio to a level such that the bit error rate [25] is above a certain threshold. For analog voice communication, the goal is to reduce the articulation performance so that the signals are difficult to understand. Hence we assume that the communication channel between a receiver and a transmitter is considered to be jammed in the presence of a jammer if ξ ≥ ξ tr where ξ tr is a threshold determined by many factors including application scenario and communication hardware. If all the parameters except the mutual distances between the jammer, transmitter and receiver are kept constant, we can conclude the following from all the above models:
between a transmitter and a receiver is considered to be jammed.
Here η is a function of ξ, P JT , P T , G T R , G RT , G JR , G RJ and D T R . Hence if the transmitter is not within a disc of radius D JR /η centered around the receiver, then the communication channel is considered to be jammed. We call this disc as the perception range. The perception range for any node depends on the distance between the jammer and the node. For effective communication between two nodes, each node should be able to transmit as well as receive messages from the other node. Hence two nodes can communicate if they lie in each other's perception range.
B. Agent dynamics and Information structure
We consider a team of m mobile agents in an ambient space Ω. The dynamics of agent i is governed by the following differential equation:
where, x i ∈ R n and u i ∈ U(t) = {φ : R → R p | φ is measurable and bounded}
The state and the controls of the jammer are represented by using J as the subscript instead of i.
represents the controls of all the agents including the jammer. Let X i denote the state-space of agent i. Let X denote the state of the entire system, X ≃ X 1 × · · · × X m × X J . Let π i : X i → Ω be the projection map from the state space of agent i to its configuration space variables [16] .
In [6] we introduce the following connectivity maintenance problem:
P1 In the present work, we make the following assumptions:
1) We assume that all the agents have an a priori knowledge of the value of the game P1. We refer to this as the value map since the techniques proposed in this work require every agent to use this information for navigation. The value at a position x ∈ X is denoted as J(x). In addition, we assume the dynamics of the agents to be decoupled. Moreover, each agent can compute its optimal control from the following expression:
2) We assume that each agent has a perfect knowledge about the initial state, X(0). Additionally, the jammer has a perfect knowledge of X(t) at all times. 3) We assume that agent i broadcasts X i (t) at all times.
Due to the presence of a jammer in the vicinity, an agent might lack state information about the other agents as the game proceeds. 4) In an ideal situation without uncertainties, each agent can predict the future state of the entire system in an open-loop manner from the initial positions of the agents and their optimal controls [1] . In this work, we assume that unmodeled uncertainties are present. These uncertainties can be in the form of disturbances present in the environment or incorrect decision making on the part of some agents in the team. Therefore, in addition to its own position, each agent relies only on the state information of those agents from whom it can receive the broadcast signal. From the last assumption, we can infer that an agent i has an accurate knowledge of X j (t) iff i lies in the perception range of agent j at time t. Therefore, at time t, the state information available to each agent can be expressed as a directed graph, I(t) = (V, E(t)) where, V = {v 1 · · · v m , v J } and E(t) = { − − → v i v j |j is in the perception range of i}. Since the agents as well as the jammer are mobile, I is a function of t and therefore, a dynamic graph [19] , [6] . We define the neighborhood of i in I as N i I = {j| − − → v j v i ∈ E(t)}. All the aforementioned assumptions are motivated from our previous works in [6] , [7] , [5] , [4] regarding jamming in formation of UAVs and multi-agent systems.
In the face of uncertainties, i can compute u * i (t) using (1) iff j ∈ N I i (t) ∀j. Due to the presence of a jammer, the latter condition might not hold. Under the assumptions stated in this section, we propose an approximation scheme and an estimator design under a decentralized information pattern that uses the value map for the agents to formulate their optimal control laws in such scenarios. Since each agent exploits the fact that all agents possess the same value map in order to compute their control the strategies can be considered to be opportunistic in nature.
III. APPROXIMATION SCHEME In this section, we introduce an approximation scheme for agents to compute their controls. These control laws are based on the value of the game under full-state information structure.
If each agent had a perfect knowledge of X(t) then it could compute u * i (t) using (1). Due to the presence of a jammer the state information available to agent i is restricted to N i I (t). Based on this information, at time t, the system can lie on any point on a manifold, M N i I , given by the following expression:
, agent i can compute u * i (x) using (1) and the value map. Since the agent i lacks perfect information about X(t) on M N i I it cannot compute u * i (x(t)). Now we present a decentralized approximation scheme that uses averaging in order to compute the control law for each agent. In this strategy, agent i computes the average of the vector u * i (x) over the entire manifold M N i I in order to obtain its control. The average,ū i , on M N i I is given by the following expression:
We assume thatū i ∈ U(t). This restricts the models of the agents for which our analysis is applicable. is not Euclidean, the integration can performed over singular chains [26] .
From an initial point x ∈ X, the time of termination of the game when all the agents follow the approximation scheme is denoted as T (x). In the next section, we present a computation of the trajectories backward in time from the terminal conditions. This construction is similar to the retrograde construction of the optimal trajectories in case of differential games.
A. Terminal Conditions
In this section, we present computation of the terminal conditions by modeling the communication network between the agents as a graph. This technique builds on our previous work on the construction and algebraic properties of statedependent graphs [6] . Here, we present a brief outline of the technique for the convenience of the reader.
In our problem, the connectivity of the network of agents depends on their position relative to the jammers. Given m agents in the network we define a graph on m vertices, G(t) = (V, E(t)), as follows. The vertex set V = {v 1 , · · · , v m } contains a node for each agent except one for the jammer. The edge set E(t) is defined as follows: E(t) = {v i v j |i and j lie in the perception range of each other} In other words, an edge exists between vertices v i and v j iff there is a communication link between agent i and agent j. From the definition of G, we can see that it is an undirected graph since two-way communication between two agents is symmetric. In this problem, the existence of a communication link between two nodes depends on the relative distance of the two nodes from the jammers. Therefore, the adjacency relation between two nodes is dependent on the state of the system. Now that we have a mapping from the state of the system to a graph G that models the communication network, we can investigate the connectivity of the network from the connectivity of G. In order to do so, we define the following mathematical object associated with a graph G having m nodes:
• Adjacency matrix : It is an m × m matrix with entries given as follows: 
Therefore, all disconnected graphs on m vertices belong to the following set:
From the above characterization of disconnected graphs, we can conclude that the algebraic multiplicity of 0 is greater than 1 for all disconnected graphs. The multiplicity of an eigenvalue can be analyzed by studying the roots of the characteristic equation associated with a matrix. Let F (λ, x) = det(L(G) − λI m ) where, I m denotes the identity matrix of dimension m × m. LetX denote the set of states that correspond to disconnected networks.
Theorem 1: [4]
Moreover, the hypersurface representing the terminal manifold is given by the following equation:
where, M
x ii is the minor of L(G) corresponding to the diagonal element in the ith row.
The above equation characterizes the terminal manifold of the game. Let {a ij } ( n 2 ) i,j=1 be a solution of Equation 3 . Each a ij depends on the relative positions of agents i, j and the jammer in the ambient space, Ω.
In the above expression, g i (·) is a function on the configuration variables of agents i, j and J that expresses the constraint in (4) . Therefore, the set of points (x 1 , · · · , x n , x J ) that lie on the terminal surface satisfy the following condition:
From the values of the state variables that satisfy the above equation we can construct N i I at termination for every agent i.
B. Retrograde Equations
In this section, we present the equations that express the evolution of the system backwards in time when the agents use the approximation scheme proposed at the beginning of this Section. Consider a point (5) on the terminal manifold. Let τ denote the retrograde time. The state of the system evolves in retrograde time according to the following equation.
Now we consider a case in which all the agents have identical dynamics. In this scenario, The number of agents in the neighborhood of an agent i changes at discrete instants of time. In order to approximate the discrete-time dynamics in continuous time we introduce the functionû α (·) [6] which is a continuous approximation to the Heavyside step function given by the following logistic function:û α (y) = 1 1 + e −αy As lim α→∞ , the logistic function takes the following form:
Hence α can be used as a parameter to vary the rate at which the exponential function decays in the neighborhood of zero. The derivative ofû α (y) with respect to time is given by the following expression:
The number of agents in the neighborhood of i in I can be approximated by the following expression:
In the above equation d J k is the distance of agent k from the jammer in Ω and d ki is distance between agent i and k in We integrate the above equations backward in time from the terminal conditions in order to obtain the trajectories in X in retrograde time. Let T (x) denote the time of termination under the proposed approximation scheme if the game starts at a point x.
Let Υ i (t) : X → X i × ⊗ j∈N i I (t) X j be a projection map from the state of the system to the information state of player i defined as follows:
Applying ξ i (·) to the value map creates a new map for agent i in which the time of termination is a function of the local information available to each agent. Each agent i can compute this projected map and find the state that matches with the information of the agent. Moreover for every point x ∈ X that lies on an optimal trajectory in the value map the following holds:
Therefore, each agent can find the termination time associated with the local information under the proposed approximation scheme. Note that Υ i (·) might not be bijective i.e., there might be many states in X that lead to the same local information for agent i. This leads to a situation similar to the presence of singular surfaces in a differential game. Therefore, assuming that the agent i lies in a region in which Υ i (·) is bijective we can find a termination time for the agent using the above construction.
C. Analysis
In this section, we provide a upper bound on T (x) based on the following assumptions on the value map:
is a Euclidean manifold. In the above expression, the jammer executes its optimal control since it is assumed in the beginning that the jammer has complete knowledge of X(t) at all times.
The rate of change of the value function at time t along the trajectory traced when the players follow the approximation scheme is given by the following expression:
In the above expression, the jammer uses its optimal control since it can be computed from the value map due to the assumption that the jammer has a complete state information at all times. From the definition of the value of the game and u * i , the rate of change of J at time t is given by the following expression:
Let us define e = J app − J. From (8) and (9), we conclude the following:
Therefore, using the third assumption we can obtain the following bound:
From the definition of u i we can conclude that u * i (x) − u * i (y) 2 ≤ β. Therefore, the above expression is bounded by the following:
From the assumptions at the beginning of this section, we obtain the following bound on the error rate:
The optimal control laws for the agents maximize the Hamiltonian, which is (1 +J) in this game. Therefore, the following always holdṡ
From the definition ofė, we obtain the following relation:
J app (t) ≥J(t) − δ
Integrating the above equation on both sides from t = 0 to t = T (x) we obtain the following:
J app (T (x 0 )) = 0 and J(T (x 0 )) = 0, since the network is disconnected at termination. Therefore, we obtain the following bound for T (x):
From the above expression, we get an upperbound for T (x 0 ). Obtaining a non-trivial lower bound for T (x) is a topic of future research.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have analyzed the problem of connectivity maintenance in multi-agent systems in the presence of a jammer. We assumed that each agent has a knowledge about the value function under perfect state information, beforehand. Due to lack of information about all the agents in the team, each agent is constrained to make a local decision based on the information about his neighbors. We proposed an online algorithm under decentralized information pattern for convergence for each player. We proposed an approximation scheme for the agents based on averaging, and provided bounds on the time of termination for the proposed scheme.
One of our ongoing efforts is to design state estimators for agents that converge in the close neighborhood of the real states [13] . In the future, we would like to combine the two techniques in order to obtain an approximation scheme based on averaging around the neighborhood of the estimated states. We believe that this will lead to reduction in the error in the estimation of the optimal control law, which would in turn provide a better bound on the value of the game.
